Game theory / Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; English editor, Mike Borns.
By: Zamir, Shmuel.
Contributor(s): Maschler, Michael | Solan, Eilon.
Material type:
TextPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013Description: xxvi, 979 pages ; 26 cm.Content type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 9781107005488.Uniform titles: Torat ha-miśḥaḳim. English Subject(s): Game theory. -- School of Pure and Applied Sciences | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / GeneralDDC classification: QA 269 .Z37 2013 Other classification: BUS069000 Online resources: Cover image | Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
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Long Loan Book
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Kirinyaga University Library General Stacks | Non-fiction | QA 269 .M37 2013 (Browse shelf) | Available | KYU/2017/5771 |
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| QA 267 .S4K64 2010 Switching and finite automata theory | QA 267 .S4K64 2010 Switching and finite automata theory | QA 267.54 K64 2010 Switching And Finite Autmata Theory | QA 269 .M37 2013 Game theory / | QA 269 .V67 1997 Game theory :lectures for economists and systems scientists | QA270 .B76 2016 Introduction to time series and forecasting / | QA270 .B76 2016 Introduction to time series and forecasting / |
Translation of: Torat ha-miśḥaḳim / Shemuʼel Zamir, Mikhaʼel Mashler ṿe-Elon Solan.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 958-967) and index.
Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The game of chess; 2. Utility theory; 3. Extensive-form games; 4. Strategic-form games; 5. Mixed strategies; 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem; 7. Equilibrium refinements; 8. Correlated equilibria; 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors; 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model; 11. The universal belief space; 12. Auctions; 13. Repeated games; 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs; 15. Bargaining games; 16. Coalitional games with transferable utility; 17. The core; 18. The Shapley value; 19. The bargaining set; 20. The nucleolus; 21. Social choice; 22. Stable matching; 23. Appendices; Index.
"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"-- Provided by publisher.